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1: Introduction 
 
The world we observe and the world we act in are one and the same world, 
and crucially so. Dualisms are rife in cognitive science, and superficially, this paper 
may seem to be an exercise in splitting things in two. Neither brain structures nor 
cognitive aptitudes nor even modes of awareness will appear safe. Yet the core 
insights of this paper are guided by the above maxim of metaphysical monism, and 
serve to reinforce it. They will concern not differences and oppositions, but rather 
cooperation and complicity. To employ a prime metaphor elaborated by Brian Smith 
(1996), this is one story of the single dance we perform in our world, and how the two 
main skills we bring to bear therein – and to dig deeper, how their neural foundations 
– result in our important achievements as thinking creatures. Though it may traffic in 
popular dualisms, this is a tale of negotiation and mutual enrichment.  
Monisms and dualities notwithstanding, there is also a three-step hierarchy 
that the following argument will scale. I will begin in the trenches of neuroscience 
and the psychology of visual perception. This will motivate a discussion of two skills 
available to perceiving creatures, skills that I will subsequently claim to be central to a 
rather sophisticated form of self-consciousness. The main charge of this paper may be 
conceptualised as the task of showing that these three domains, of visual perception, 
of vital ways of interacting with the world, and of self-consciousness, are importantly 
interconnected. 
In what follows, I will build the case for two broad realms of embodied, 
embedded cognitive capability, referred to as separation and engagement in honour of 
Smith’s (1996) usage, being directly enabled by the functions characterising ventral 
stream and dorsal stream visual processing, respectively. Separation and engagement 
are our twin abilities to represent what is at a spatial or temporal distance from our 
local and present surroundings on the one hand, and to interact with our immediate, 
available environments, on the other. I will commence by exploring the perceptual 
performances made possible by the ventral and dorsal streams of the visual system. 
Based on empirical findings and theoretical analysis, I will draw out the relationship 
between ventral processing and a modest form of separation, and indeed, between 
dorsal processing, ecological perception, and engagement.  
This strictly segregated dialectic will soon begin to seem artificial. It will 
therefore be synthesised by way of arguments for the necessity of dorsally mediated 
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processing for full-fledged separation, and the metaphysically indispensable position 
of the functions of ventral processing in engagement as we know it. Finally, I will 
attempt to show that full-fledged separation is what catalyses the transition from 
being an aware subject to being an object of self-awareness. Yet full-fledged 
separation cannot exist in the absence of an engaged, active life and the neural 
processing that supports it. Therefore, my claim will be that a sophisticated kind of 
self-consciousness can be traced back to the functions of the two visual streams via 
the interlaced achievements of separation and engagement. Prior to my closing 
remarks, I will advance some clarifications of this thesis and field objections as to its 
implications for the nature of cognition.  
 
2: The Visual Brain 
 
 The mammalian brain, many researchers agree, processes visual scenes along 
two major neural pathways (Goodale & Milner, 2004; Carruthers, 2005; Norman, 
2002). In fact, a variety of organisms, mammalian or not, display a division of labour 
in visual processing. Frogs have one system for dodging obstacles, one for controlling 
tongue-snaps in the direction of food, and at least three other visuomotor modules 
(Goodale & Milner, 2004).  
What is interesting about the division of visual processing in mammals – what 
is interesting about humans – is exactly what our two major visual streams function to 
do. In humans, vision begins with light impinging on the retinal surface. There, light 
wavelengths are transduced into neural activation and signals are sent up the optic 
nerve, via a pit-stop at the lateral geniculate nucleus roughly midway along the length 
of the brain, to the primary visual cortex (V1). This area in the occipital lobe at the 
back of the brain is a sorting hub for the all-but-raw visual information. A coarse 
sketch of such properties of the visible tableau as colour, edges, textures, and motion 
is pieced together before it is relayed back toward more frontal brain areas for further 
processing (Goodale & Westwood, 2004; Clark, 2004).  
The two major routes for information originating in V1 form an acute angle, 
one route climbing dorsally towards the crown of the head, particularly to the back of 
the parietal lobe, and the other diving ventrally towards the area between the ears, to 
the lower regions of the temporal lobe. These two paths are called the dorsal and 
ventral visual streams, respectively. It is largely these neural pathways that make our 
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experiences of and responses to our visual world possible. There are additional direct 
connections between the retina and dorsal areas via evolutionarily more ancient 
midbrain structures. These visual structures in the human subcortex happen to be the 
dominant visual centres in non-mammalian vertebrates. For example, it is an analogue 
of this area which controls the aforementioned tongue-snapping motion in frogs 
(Goodale & Milner, 2004).  
A huge corpus of work in vision science has accumulated around the so-called 
dual visual system consisting of the V1-to-ventral pathway and the V1-to-dorsal 
pathway. Much of this work has sought to demonstrate that these streams deserve to 
be differentiated functionally as well as anatomically (cf. Goodale & Milner, 2004; 
Westwood, Chapman, & Roy, 2000; Grill-Spector, 2003).1 Insights from neural 
pathologies have led to a functional characterisation of the ventral and dorsal streams 
that has since received a great deal of empirical support.  
The first relevant disorder, optic ataxia, is a condition following lesions along 
the parietal dorsal stream. Sufferers have no trouble at all recognising, labelling, 
reproducing, or remembering items that populate their visual scenes. Asked to act 
upon those items, however – to reach for a comb or open a door – the movements of 
optic ataxics are exaggerated and inappropriately scaled.2 Conversely, a disorder 
called visual form agnosia spares the ability to execute neat and appropriate actions 
within a visible environment, but strips patients of the capacity to name, draw, or 
otherwise indicate what things they can see (Westwood, Chapman, & Roy, 2000). For 
visual form agnosics, who have damage to portions of their ventral streams, 
achievable actions grossly out-span any demonstrable knowledge of the contents of 
the visual scene (Norman, 2002).  
The functions lost in optic ataxia and visual form agnosia respectively – the 
functions subserved by the two visual streams – can therefore be said to have been 
doubly dissociated from one another in empirical settings (Goodale & Milner, 2004). 
The usual interpretation of double dissociation, wherein each function can be shown 
                                                
1 Inversely, holding a functional – not architectural – divide to be basic, some researchers 
have sought to attribute functions to medial regions between the parietal and temporal lobes 
so as to blur the purported strict anatomical segregation between streams (Gallese, 2007).  
2 A recent review by Rossetti and colleagues disputes the dominant characterisation of optic 
ataxia, hypothesising that the disorder is a deficit of on-line control which becomes 
significant only when action programming processes are taxed, as when targets are in the 
periphery. The import of this alternative treatment remains to be determined (Rossetti, Pisella, 
& Vighetto, 2003).  
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to exist though the other function is lost, is that the underlying mechanisms which 
support those functions are in some sense independent (Bedford, 1997). But what 
exactly are the functions carried out independently by the ventral and dorsal streams? 
Originally, it was thought that the two pathways engaged in object discrimination and 
spatial localisation, respectively. This led to their being labelled the what and where 
pathways. Nowadays, the dorsal stream is thought to enable visually guided action, 
like reaching, ducking, and navigation. For this reason, it is now known as the how, 
not where, stream (Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005).  
The visual world according to the dorsal stream is a topography of information 
to facilitate motor interaction with a scene, including a sequence of egocentric 
invariants – measures stable enough with respect to the eyes or other body parts to be 
useful for visuomotor performance (Norman, 2002; Cohen & Andersen, 2002). These 
invariants are calculated quickly and with astounding accuracy. They are absolute 
measures, which is to say that they do not represent the parts of the scene to which 
action will be directed in relation to other parts of the scene; that could result in size 
or shape or orientation illusions. After all, with respect to the height of professional 
basketball players, the net might seem about a metre out of reach, but if I attempted a 
slam-dunk based on this information, my movements would be utterly inept.  
Nearer the base of the brain, a different world is pieced together. It is chiefly 
in the ventral stream that a scene populated with individual objects, as opposed to a 
canvas of spatiotemporal properties, is constructed. For example, neurons selectively 
sensitive to houses and faces can be found in the ventral regions of modern primate 
brains (Grill-Spector, 2003). It is useful to think of ventral areas as processing vision-
for-judgement, in other words, as providing a visual landscape of information to 
answer questions of various cognitive complexities: what is that thing? how heavy is 
it? will it fit? is it mine? Another perspective is one advanced by Jeannerod and Jacob 
(2005); the ventral stream, they claim, is occupied with the task of perceptual 
selection:  
The selection phase consists in both segregating a complex visual 
array into several separable objects and in attributing to each separate 
object its own set of appropriate visual attributes (this is the so-called 
‘binding’ problem). Usually the color and texture of an object will be 
highly relevant to its perceptual selection from a set of neighboring 
objects. Segregation and binding require that the relative spatial locations 
of different objects in a visual array be coded (p. 303) 
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As Jeannerod and Jacob point out, ventral processing is relational instead of 
absolute. The ventral stream happily compares the height of the basketball net to the 
height of the players – only then can it partition the scene into items moving relative 
to the stationary background, reaching about this high off the ground, and on the other 
hand, an item that begins to fill space a little bit further up (Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005). 
Ventral processing is slower than dorsal processing. It is furthermore allocentric, with 
objects being selected in a perspective-neutral way (Schenk, 2006). Perspective-
neutrality is achieved by encoding enduring properties centred on spatial locations in 
the world, producing measures which are not directly altered by every eye saccade 
and head movement (Norman, 2002). Allocentric processing, in turn, facilitates the 
tasks of object recognition and identification. 
Object recognition and identification may, incidentally, seem strange things to 
add free of charge to the repertoire of ventral processing. It is one thing to see objects, 
and quite another to see which objects there are. Plausibly, the latter could involve 
non-visual neural systems. The specific topic of recognition and identification will be 
treated later. Nonetheless, a general methodological concern remains. How do we 
know when we are conflating the processing of one brain region with that of other 
regions? And to turn the tables, is it valid to theoretically isolate ventral or dorsal 
processes from one another, and from the remainder of a network with which they are 
massively interconnected, especially considering that some aspects of visual 
processing occur in more primitive brain areas like the superior colliculus, while 
others take place in higher cognitive areas like prefrontal cortex (Goodale & Milner, 
2004; Jeannerod, 2006)? My own explorations will involve prising apart ventral and 
dorsal functions. Is this justified? 
In best appeasing the competing forces of understanding brain area 
contributions and respecting neurofunctional interdependence, a good starting point is 
the robustness of the cortical brain. Brains are surprisingly good at withstanding local 
damage. Even functions which usually cooperate in cognition, like having 
kinaesthetic sensations in a limb and knowing the limb to be one’s own, can be 
dissociated. Dissociation makes it sensible to analyse the brain by evoking somewhat 
localised, independent functions which are eventually integrated instead of insisting 
on black-box holism. It also provides a heuristic for judging whether distinct 
processes are being conflated. If ventrally lesioned subjects can identify objects – 
based on verbal descriptions, perhaps – and vice versa, then vision and object 
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identification ought to be treated as importantly distinct. Such functional segregation 
and anatomical segmentation should not be overdone, however. Specifically, 
empirical demonstrations of dissociation are on much securer ground than theoretical 
stipulations that one area does not depend on the operation of another. Since I want 
each visual system in particular and not just the brain in general to do some work in 
my account, I will engage in the latter ill-advised project to put maximal pressure on 
my own arguments for each visual stream supporting special cognitive skills 
(particularly in upcoming discussions of creatures I will call Vee and Dai).  
Fortunately, this approach is only temporary. I will eventually discuss higher-
level skills enabled by sets of functions which it would be foolish to imagine existing 
without interweaving contributions from several parts of the brain. As these skills 
come to the fore, I will abandon the strategy of underemphasising functional 
cooperation in order to give proper weight to how rich and vital those skills are. In the 
meantime, the main danger my temporary strategy poses is that attempts to explain 
which neural processes enable which skills, and which skills enable which sorts of 
consciousness, could turn out to be futile because those processes, skills, or types of 
consciousness are direct outcomes of neurofunctional interconnections which I 
happen to have overlooked. Towards the end of the paper I will address this issue, 
advancing reasons to believe that the order of developmental sophistication is as I 
claim it to be; it is raw visual abilities which bring on cognitive aptitudes, which in 
turn promote new modes of awareness. 
That said, we may properly return to the world of the visual system, for a few 
points remain to be made. To recap, the dorsal stream speedily processes visual 
information from V1 and the midbrain into egocentric, absolute metrics which 
facilitate enactive interaction with the visual world. The ventral stream uses 
information from V1 to construct a world of objects. It employs allocentric and 
relational measures to arrange bunches of properties into items. Much more will be 
said about objects in what follows, and the issues of recognition and identification 
will be revisited, but for the present, there are two controversies about the dual visual 
system that deserve comment.  
The first controversy surrounds the exact anatomical location of the purported 
streams, and the exact functional attributes that can be mapped onto each location. In 
the introduction I alluded to the fact that I was not interested in the dichotomy 
proposed by the dual visual systems hypothesis per se, as much as the functions 
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proposed to be supported by this processing. Theorists such as Glover (2004) and 
Jeannerod (2006) propose reconceptualisations of the roles of dorsal and ventral – and 
in some cases, ‘ventro-dorsal’ (Gallese, 2007) – regions. However, neither the exact 
architecture of the visual system, nor the precise allocation of functions to brain 
regions really changes my account. It is enough for my purposes if all agree that the 
clusters of functions first attributed to ventral and dorsal streams – rightly or wrongly 
so – do exist and are significant. Even should the neural sources of this insight turn 
out to be misplaced, nobody in vision science would dispute the importance of 
processing visual information to guide action as well as to carve a visual world of 
objects. Those ideas, not any exact neural geography, are what ultimately ground this 
account.  
The second issue is the question of perceptual consciousness. As seen above, 
it is possible to demarcate the functions of the ventral and dorsal streams without 
taking a stance on phenomenological visual consciousness, but to ignore the issue in 
the context of an essay setting conditions on the achievement of self-consciousness 
would be suspicious, to say the least. The predicament is this. Milner and Goodale, 
the main proponents of the modern duplex vision hypothesis, have maintained that 
ventral visual processing, but not dorsal processing, is a necessary condition for 
consciously experiencing visual scenes. Their famous visual agnosic patient, D.F., 
was stripped of conscious access to a visual world of objects. Milner and Goodale 
attributed D.F.’s remaining degraded visual experience to spared areas along her V1-
to-inferotemporal-lobe pathway (Goodale & Milner, 2004). Dorsal stream processing 
was excluded from the story of visual consciousness, not so much because D.F.’s 
remaining perceptual awareness seemed somehow uncharacteristic of dorsally 
processed information, but more because the researchers’ stipulated role for dorsal 
visual information made it an inappropriate candidate for entry into consciousness 
(Goodale, 2005). This reasoning led them to assert that “conscious visual experience 
of the world is a product of the ventral not the dorsal stream” (2004, p. 109).  
What Milner and Goodale have on their side is patients’ reports about what 
they can see. Ventral processing gives rise to reports of seeing objects. Reportability, 
verbal or demonstrative, has been equated with visual consciousness both by 
researchers who subscribe to the idea of ventral processing producing visual 
consciousness and those who do not (Goodale & Milner, 2004; McIntosh et al, 2003; 
Johnson & Haggard, 2005). This equation has been challenged. There may be 
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conscious but unreportable experiential contents (Nudds, 2007), and reports may 
reflect analytic knowledge about oneself not directly available in experience (Clark, 
2007), as when I successfully reproduce a deviation in my hand’s reach though I have 
no real-time experience of the reasons for, means towards, end state of, or metrics 
pertaining to the deviation as I act (Johnson & Haggard, 2005). Two kinds of dorsal 
visual content of the experienced but unreportable variety may be what has been 
termed directive content by Nudds, and the related idea of presence. These putative 
conscious contents contribute respectively to the experience of acting under visual 
guidance and to the feeling of being spatially enveloped by a scene (Nudds, 2007; 
Loomis, 1992; Matthen, 2005). Among those researchers who meet Milner and 
Goodale’s reportability trump-card head on are Johnson and Haggard (2005), whose 
subjects non-verbally reported on an unnoticed reaching detour by reproducing it even 
as they failed to verbally report the change of course. Without taking an explicit 
stance on reportability, Gallese (2007) has claimed on separate grounds that dorsal 
processing contributes to perceptual awareness of space and to action understanding. 
Whether consciousness of a visual scene is enabled by the ventral or dorsal 
stream or both is beyond the scope of this paper. It falls to me, rather, to show that I 
may safely put this issue aside while still hoping to give a right account of the kind of 
self-consciousness that develops in a separated, engaged creature. I believe visual 
consciousness and self-consciousness are orthogonal enough to make this possible.  
The contents of visual consciousness may be thought of as renderings of the 
information implicit in a retinal image that come into contact with knowledge, 
(motor) know-how, or expectations, perhaps including efference copy information, in 
order to produce intelligent or appropriate response in the world. Notice that this 
wording is neutral about which functional areas in the brain mediate visual awareness 
(cf. the similar but non-neutral wording in Clark, 2007). The contents of the varieties 
of self-consciousness I will discuss will play a role alongside other knowledge in 
bestowing survival advantage upon the conscious creature, just like visual experiences 
do. The difference is that self-conscious contents at least: a) implicitly or 
nonconceptually contain some ‘self’ content, whether this be a perspectival, agentive, 
egocentric, or otherwise self-specifying bit of the experience, and at most: b) have the 
capacity to contain, over and above the content in a), an explicit or conceptual or self-
referring content. All this remains elusive at this stage. What is central, however, is 
that visual consciousness is about visual surroundings, whereas self-consciousness is 
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directed at the experiencing self. Of course, there will turn out to be a link between 
visually processed information and selfhood. That is the topic of this paper. But the 
kinds of self-consciousness pursued via these arguments will not lean on the 
experiential character of visual experience at all.  
 
3: Perception for Separation and Engagement 
 
 One group of tasks Milner and Goodale administered to visual agnosic patient 
D.F. involved pantomiming actions. Pantomimed actions are delayed actions towards 
objects which have been removed from the visual scene for long enough that dorsally 
extracted information, being evanescent and constantly revised, will have decayed. 
These actions are therefore said to be done off-line (Westwood, Chapman, & Roy, 
2000). D.F. and other ventrally lesioned persons are good at on-line visually guided 
action, but perform poorly when asked to pantomime. They make to grasp just-seen 
objects by means of inaccurate grip postures, for instance. Optic ataxics, however, 
display improved performance when asked to pantomime. For these patients, 
ventrally encoded information is more helpful than the disrupted information from the 
dorsal stream that usually commands their actions, and when dorsal information has 
decayed, they can mobilise ventral information in producing an educated, if 
imperfect, pantomimed grasp (Goodale & Milner, 2004). 
 These results cannot be explained solely on the basis that ventral stream 
information decays slowly enough to be recruited to control ataxics’ actions. Rather, 
ventral stream vision feeds into perceptual memory. When I turn off a lamp and walk 
away, I can still roughly remember its dimensions and position, and am able to 
indicate the lampshade’s height and girth based on memory. The philosophically 
remarkable thing about pantomiming actions on the basis of ventral vision is that it 
nicely demonstrates that objects seen during direct sensory coupling with the world 
can be unplugged and carried around in the head. What D.F. cannot do, then – what a 
dorsal stream cannot do – is take visual perception off-line. It is a ravenous and 
amnesic system; without constant contact with the world that serves it as input, it is 
crippled. Of course, it is advantageous that dorsal processing be frequently refreshed. 
That is what makes dorsal information so precious in the here-and-now. Yet the fact 
remains: whereas the ventral stream can sift away the sensory inundation of the world 
and collect its favoured nuggets of information, packaging them for pick-up by 
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memory systems, the information extracted by the dorsal stream cannot survive 
isolated from an embodied, embedded context. 
All living creatures can engage with their local surroundings by acting, being 
acted upon, and generally responding to the world insofar as it is immediately 
available, examinable, malleable though refractory, and significant for continued 
survival. Situated roboticists have attempted to instil such engagement skills into their 
creations, with encouraging results (Brooks, 1991). Many creatures also make contact 
with the world via the skill of separation. Separation is characterised by thought 
about objects, paradigmatically when those objects are temporally or spatially 
removed from the thinking creature. In artificial intelligence, separation has points of 
contact with symbol-crunching von Neumann machines like personal computers. 
Once situated cognition joined Cartesian dualism among the ranks of valuable meta-
theoretic frameworks for the study of mind, analogues of the ideas of both separation 
and engagement became common themes in cognitive science. To form a rather 
sloppy (and at times arguably orthogonal) list of similar distinctions, there is: 
mentality and physicality, representation-heavy and representation-free tasks, thought 
and action, and descriptive and demonstrative reference. 
A thinker without engagement skills would of necessity inhabit a mental realm 
wholly disconnected from any active existence in a material world. And a creature 
without separation skills would be stuck in a closed loop with its environment. A 
main premise of this paper is that a creature with no hope of effecting separation from 
its environment would fall short of conditions for sophisticated self-consciousness. So 
far, the borderlands between separation and engagement have not been adequately 
delineated. I will eventually position such themes as causal effectiveness, 
representation, ecological perception, visual tracking, and feature-placing in the 
picture. For now, it is enough to note that occurrences of engagement, broadly 
construed, are curiously widespread. 
According to Smith (1996), the phenomenon of deixis is commonplace. Deixis 
is another word for indexicality, that is, orientation relative to some origin (Pylyshyn, 
2000). It is called egocentricity whenever there is an ego of which to speak. Every 
physical event, Smith believes, consists of clashes between deictic forces. Magnetic 
forces pull, towards their centre, iron filings which resist being pulled away from their 
own centres of gravity. Whether or not the physical substrate is steeped in deixis, it is 
relatively incontrovertible that physical changes brought about by ordinary material 
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objects, biological thinkers included, radiate from roughly centred locations. It is easy 
to hop ten centimetres, and harder to do a long-jump. Note that the skill of 
engagement requires lots of proverbial hops, whereas separation takes long-jumps. 
Smith (2001) claims that indexicality lies at the heart of the skill of engagement. And 
insofar as deixis is ‘cheap’ in the above sense, while non-indexical activity is 
expensive, engagement is cheapened compared to separation.3 Glibly stated, 
engagement-as-deixis is a plentiful and low-cost; separation is rarer and costlier.  
Indeed, it will emerge that separation is not only rare and expensive, but 
precious. In Brian Smith’s words, “what it is to think [..] is to represent the world out 
there, beyond the periphery, by rearranging your internal configuration, and adopting 
appropriate habits and practices, so as to behave appropriately with respect to—so as 
to develop hypotheses concerning, so as to stand in appropriate normative relation 
to—that to which you are not, at the moment, physically coupled” (2001, ms. p. 10, 
cf. p. 17). Smith is referring to a very rich notion of separation here. The perceptual 
memory of a lampshade pales in comparison. Yet there is a strong connection 
between rich separation and memorable lampshades. In order to draw the connection, 
more has to be said about perceiving the world.  
Some theorists reserve the word perception for the processes and products of 
ventral stream activity (Goodale & Milner, 2004). Others, notably J.J. Gibson (1979), 
have felt comfortable applying the idea of perception to dorsal-style activity. I believe 
privileging ventral processing in this regard depends on two theoretical confounds, 
between the ideas of perception and conscious sensation on the one hand, and 
conscious vision and ventral processing on the other. Similarly, Gibsonian theorists 
take a reductive tack, equating perception with direct, pre-conscious loops of acting 
and reacting in the world. Since neither of these equations should be adopted without 
justification, I will use perception as a blanket term for both kinds of visual function. 
To make a stronger point, I will take it that visual perception occurs through the 
general cooperation of ventral and dorsal streams. Recalling our early maxim: the 
world is one, and metaphysically, perceptual reality is unified. In fact, so too is our 
phenomenology of acting and observing. If the ventral and dorsal stream were not 
cooperative, we would sense tension between action and observation. Only in 
                                                
3 Of course, skilled survival-enhancing engagement is expensive – think of how hard it has 
been to construct a robot with a natural gait. It is simply the ability to make a mess within a 
centred radius that is easy. More will be said about ‘rich’ engagement later. 
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pathological cases or empirical settings does this occur. Dorsal and ventral streams act 
in exquisite synchrony to create a perceptual habitat for sighted, embodied creatures. 
Despite that conciliatory note, it is time to divide duplex visual perception into 
its elements, knowing full well that there will ultimately be a consequential reunion 
party. Given what was noted about the skills of engagement and separation, what can 
be said about the main contributions of ventral versus dorsal processes? I will contend 
that ventral processing is effortless proto-separation, and dorsal processing is 
engagement. Perception is both engagement and an effortless proto-separation, and is 
subserved by the two visual systems. The core paradigm for explaining engagement is 
Gibsonian ecological perception. The core idea behind proto-separation is Jacob and 
Jeannerod’s idea of selection, of the binding of visual properties at locations into what 
I will hereafter call proto-objects, thus downgrading from my previous references to 
ventrally constructed objects. Proto-objects are “clusters of proximal features that 
serve as precursors in the detection of real physical objects. What [different uses of 
proto-object] have in common is that they refer to something more than a localized 
property or ‘feature’ and less than a recognized 3D distal object” (Pylyshyn, 2001, p. 
144n). Let us tackle the ideas of effortless proto-separation and engagement one at a 
time. 
 
3.1: Ventral Processing and Proto-Separation 
 
It will be worthwhile to sketch some of the properties of ventrally mediated 
effortless proto-separation. Here, let me introduce Vee. Vee is a hypothetical creature 
whose non-mammalian brain – including her midbrain visual system – has just 
evolved a skeletal V1-to-ventral pathway. The key constraint on Vee is that she has 
no dorsal stream. I will use Vee’s case to flesh out the achievements and 
shortcomings of ventral stream contributions to vision and cognition.  
 First, in what ways is ventral processing separation? As Smith (1999) notes, 
attempts to model perception by A.I. researchers have revealed that the world is 
metaphysically chaotic, “an extraordinarily rich, four-dimensional world (time & 
space), that instantiates a bewildering array of features – colours, smells, textures, 
fogginess, whatever – without any concomitant commitment to individuals or 
identity” (ms. p. 10). To make this messy world tidier, Vee must detach from it ever 
so slightly, forsaking completely immersed activity. By giving Vee landscapes of 
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proto-objects (popjects for short)4 perched upon and behind and occluding more 
popjects, the ventral stream produces the barest state of observer-side estrangement or 
abstraction away from a scene. In a sense, seeing popjects is taking a step back from 
reality to get a better view.  
These metaphors can be given some grounding. Proto-separation has a 
standard recipe for the enterprise of popject-making. Ventral vision makes objects out 
of visual features – properties like lines, textural grain, shading, and edges – likely by 
binding or tagging them to locations (Smith, 1999; Campbell, 2006). I quoted 
Pylyshyn (2001) as saying that popjects were thicker notions than visual features. 
According to Austen Clark (2004), popjects are moreover thicker notions than located 
visual features, which result from the procedure of feature-placing, a coordination of 
spatiotemporal positions with sensory feature maps. Crafting popjects requires more 
prowess than feature-placing because the former would overwhelm the modest 
computational resources involved in attending to or indexing bits of a sensory tableau. 
Think of how many overlapping or proximal visual features make up a bottle of 
water. Humans are said to be able to attend to about four items in a visual scene at a 
time (Clark, 2004). Clearly, carving a real world into popjects involves binding more 
than four features to each location. This leads Clark to claim that seeing popjects 
requires more functionality, and further dedicated mechanism, than that which 
enables feature-placing. I believe this selection mechanism, whether it is attention-
like, or memory-like, or a matter of taking the temporally synchronised firing of 
feature-placing neurons to indicate the presence of a popject, is the paramount and 
constitutive achievement of ventral visual processing.  
In a roundabout way, this helps explain how popjects give separation a 
foothold. Smith (1996) identifies four ways in which the ability to non-effectively 
track, or attend to what is no longer coupled to a creature’s sensory system, 
foreshadows full-fledged separation. I believe these criteria already apply to Vee’s 
creation of popjects, which precedes non-effective tracking because it does not 
conceptually necessitate access to memory (we will soon see that practically, popjects 
are ineffective without the aid of memory systems). Smith’s (1996, pp. 222-224) signs 
of fledgling separation are: 
 
                                                
4 Popject is simply a play on a shortened form of proto-object, p-object, which highlights the 
3D pop-up metaphor implicit in discussions of figure-ground segregation.  
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1. The newfound coherence of distinguishing between what Vee is 
doing (in Smith’s case, non-effectively tracking; in ours, seeing 
popjects) and how she does it.  
2. The potential for error, which is symptomatic of loosened coupling 
between Vee and her environment. 
3. That Vee must suddenly shoulder commitment to and responsibility 
for her rendering of the world. 
4. That Vee now has use for wiles and mechanisms that extend, 
improve, or support her rendering of the world. 
 
Wherever ventral selection mechanisms are mobilised to create popjects, it 
makes sense to discriminate between what Vee does and how she manages it. Vee’s 
ventral mechanisms could have been engineered differently by evolution. And there 
are different ways for the very same ventral mechanisms to popjectify – different 
ways in which collections of features can become popjects. There is choice in the 
matter. What extent of spatial overlap between features is needed? Which features 
demarcate boundaries and which indicate lighting? Contrastively, it is a crucial point 
that visually tracking – otherwise known as effectively tracking (Smith, 1996) – what 
is continuously in view is such a physically (Pylyshyn, 2000) and conceptually 
(Smith, 1996; Bermúdez, 1995) foundational ability that there are no choices 
involved. There is only one way to visually track, by sequentially accessing 
spatiotemporal points without reference to particular located features (Pylyshyn, 
2000). One tracks by tracking locations, and locations have no properties other than 
being locations. More, tracking mechanisms could not have been engineered 
differently without changing what the creature could be said to be doing. Tracking by 
indexing features or attending to popjects or objects would not open a how/what rift 
for tracking. It would only change the parameters of the act so that it no longer 
qualified as tracking at all. A similar lack of wiggle-room plagues feature-placing; to 
bind a feature to a place just is to bind the feature at a point to that point. The creation 
of popjects marks the beginning of a coherent distinction between what is 
accomplished and how. 
The second criterion, the potential for error, arises because making popjects is 
a way of representing the world, as I will contend below. As to the third point, Vee 
must take responsibility for her choice of popject-landscape in a very primal sense. 
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Making popjects out of the wrong collections of features could get Vee eaten or lead 
to her starvation. Finally, Vee certainly does have use for extensions to her ventral 
mechanisms. That is why, when the opportunity presents itself for Vee’s proto-
separation to become full-fledged separation, evolution favours that change. It will 
emerge that a fully separated creature just is a proto-separated creature with added 
functionality emerging from its immersion in a social and encompassing material 
world. In embodying Smith’s four signs, Vee firmly has her feet on the road to 
separation. 
 How far from that destination does Vee stand? That is, what makes her skill 
one of proto-separation? Viewing scenes as composed of popjects is not full-fledged 
separation because popjects cannot easily defy their present spatial contexts. A 
popject cannot defy its visual context because, as Smith’s (1996) says, it is not 
properly “‘sedimented’ or ‘extruded’,” by the perceiver, “as a discrete autonomous 
individual [..] and thereby locate[d] in the wider world” (p. 225). It is as though proto-
separation crafts engagement-based objects, but it is these same popjects which will 
become the thick objects that populate our thoughts. 
The close coupling of popjects to a present locale may seem at odds with my 
discussion of perceptual memory. Yet an optic ataxic’s ventral stream setup will have 
points of departure from Vee’s. Whether a skeletal ventral stream would have access 
to, or be accessible to, perceptual memory is a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, to 
illustrate perceptual popjects’ lack of ‘sedimentation’ – their instability – we may 
consider two possibilities. First, imagine Vee’s popjects cannot enter into perceptual 
memory. Without memory we could not visualise popjects without direct sensory 
access to them. Vee’s popjects would disappear every time she shut her eyes. Clearly, 
these would not be discrete autonomous individuals. More telling is the case where 
Vee’s popjects are granted access to perceptual memory. In this case, popjects would 
still be unstable, because there is much more to objecthood than simple formal 
coherence. For one thing, Vee would have to conceive of her popjects as causally 
efficacious entities. Much more will be said about the difference between popjects 
and objects when the conditions of full-fledged separation are explored. 
Finally, what makes effortless proto-separation effortless? It is the bare 
function of ventral processing to present Vee with a visual world of popjects. No 
further reasoning or decision-making is needed for this to happen. This is implicit in 
the neural architecture. Maps of visual features sent from V1 are integrated right 
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inside the ventral stream (Goodale & Milner, 2004). An example may be illustrative. 
D.F.’s brain disorder is specifically apperceptive agnosia. She can see visual features 
with great acuity, but her brain does not build objects out of these. In contrast, 
associative agnosics have a higher-level disorder. They see objects, but cannot 
categorise or name them (Nudds, 2007). They do not have problems with the more 
fundamental skill of effortless proto-separation, being adequate at drawing objects or 
matching them. There are no apperceptive agnosics who nevertheless have associative 
abilities because labelling occurs downstream of ventral processing. Naming and 
categorisation necessitate cooperation between the ventral stream and higher-level 
areas of the cortical brain. They are effortful inasmuch as they require extra 
processing of visually pre-processed information.  
As well as resulting from perceptual selection and being allocentric and 
relational, ventral stream content is presentational. Presentational content represents 
the way things really are in the world, independent of observer attitudes (Nudds, 
2007). Notice that once full-fledged separation is achieved, once objects can be 
unplugged from environments and thought of as autonomous individuals, they lose 
this claim to veridicality; there can no longer be said to be an overarching mind-to-
world direction of fit between those contemplated objects and reality (Jeannerod & 
Jacob, 2005). As a fully separated creature, I can imagine objects that do not exist, 
and I can imagine real objects existing in hypothetical arrangements. 
Proto-separated content is also representational. It may not create the richest 
of representations, ones “whose functional role is to act as de-coupleable surrogates 
for specifiable (usually extra-neural) states of affairs” (Clark & Grush, 1999, p. 8), but 
it results from an almost paradigmatic act of information dilation and compression, 
whereby raw data is given more or less consideration by a processing system. Ventral 
processing dilates information about localised features collected at a location while 
compressing less important noise like the precise wavelengths hitting the retinal 
surface. For Clark and Toribio (1994), information dilation and compression are 
marks of a system that is at least modestly representational. Crucially, dilation and 
compression allow proto-separated representations to be erroneous, therefore 
fulfilling Smith’s second criterion. Ventral vision may be presentational, but at a level 
of description below that of observer attitudes, it does take liberties in parsing a scene. 
This flexibility is one of the culprits behind visual illusions. Lastly, representations 
created by Vee’s ventral stream are nonconceptual. These are representations that do 
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not make direct use of concepts – those mental representations that are flexibly 
recombinable constituents of thought (Kirsh, 1991).  
 I mentioned that proto-separation creates an informational overlay and 
therefore a visual evidential base to which decision-making processes can look in 
producing visually guided judgements. But what about the very simplest of visual 
judgements, those of recognising and reidentifying objects? Are those handled inside 
Vee’s ventral stream, or do they require inferential or rational capacities? 
The ideas of recognition and reidentification lack universal interpretations. I 
will adopt the term recognition for repeated visual identification which does not 
require thinking of the recognised object as any particular thing. Especially forbidden 
is recognising the object as something exhibiting object permanence – persistence in 
the world across a break in observation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1995). In fact, there is 
one description that may be permitted in the case of recognised objects, that of being 
‘seen before’ or ‘familiar’ or ‘the same’. Strawson (1959) appears to use the word 
recognition in this way (p. 76). Reidentification, on the other hand, I will take to entail 
the observer’s positing a world out there such that a concrete object, twice 
encountered, must have been at sequential spatiotemporal positions in that world 
throughout its absence from view. As Dennett strikingly puts it: “Many organisms 
'experience' the sun, and even guide their lives by its passage. [..] But we human 
beings don't just track the sun, we make an ontological discovery about the sun: it's 
the sun! The very same sun every day” (1996, p. 58). For Strawson, recognition is a 
perverse breed of identification, since repeated identification and knowledge of a 
continuous external reality are to his mind tightly connected. However, I will 
illustrate that mere recognition is the only kind of reidentification applicable to 
popjects. 
 Vee will have recognition capacities due to her ventral stream that a more 
primitive creature – a purely midbrain-sighted one, say – would not. Here we must 
make a two-pronged amendment to the story, gifting Vee with a memory and 
attentional system, and admitting memory and attention into the category of cognitive 
functions necessary for full-fledged separation (Kirsh, 1991; Campbell, 1995). 
Attention is necessary for whatever ventral mechanisms produce popjects. Memory is 
necessary for recognition, and the importance of recognition should come as no 
surprise considering it is a precursor to reidentifying individuals, a skill given pride of 
place in numerous accounts of cognitive development (Strawson, 1959; Evans, 1982; 
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Dennett, 1996). With memory and attention abilities, Vee should to least be able to 
recognise popjects whose appearances are stable (perhaps because Vee’s body 
remains stationary) over short spans of time. Indeed, in humans and monkeys, there is 
evidence that certain ventral stream neurons are significantly more active for 
recognised faces than detected but unrecognised ones (Grill-Spector, 2003). Even 
supposing a large change in perspective on a visual scene, or a mutating popject, Vee 
should be able to register the familiarity of popjects because of the relational positions 
they occupy in allocentrically processed scenes.  
What Vee cannot be assumed to have is the ability to reidentify. She cannot 
yet be assumed to have a conception of external reality and stable objects moving and 
existing within it. According to Strawson (1959), reidentification, object permanence, 
and external reality are jointly earned. “For on the one hand places are defined only 
by the relations of things; and, on the other, one of the requirements for the identity of 
a material thing is that its existence, as well as being continuous in time, should be 
continuous in space” (p. 37). Vee’s world is more sophisticated than that of a frog 
tracking its moving prey, but less so than that of a four year old human. Perhaps she 
totters between recognition and reidentification like a human infant: 
Before objects are permanent, infants conceive of the external 
world as what is present now. Nothing is hidden because there is nowhere 
else to be. However, this does not mean that they are solely influenced by 
the present. Representations constructed from previous encounters are 
maintained in memory, and current perceptions may be interpreted in 
terms of them [..]. These memories create an internal realm, but before 
things are permanent, these memories do not refer to an enduring world 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1995, p. 60) 
 
 In the next section, I will put forward conditions which would enable a proto-
separated creature to develop into a fully separated one, able to entertain thoughts 
about autonomous individual objects in a continuously extant material world.  
 
3.2: Becoming Separate 
 
 In preceding sections, I have alternated between two construals of full-fledged 
separation. On the one hand, I claimed that full-fledged separation involves thinking 
about true autonomous objects, not perceptual popjects. On the other, I emphasised 
that full-fledged separation is reflection on what is spatially or temporally removed 
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from the thinker. These descriptions merge when we think of separation as the ability 
to have conceptual thoughts.  
Let us consider some species of thoughts. Imagine a creature having a thought 
like 
Firas is quick, 
where quickness can be thought about only whenever Firas is thought about, or, 
where quickness cannot be thought about whenever foxes are thought about. 
  
Such a thought would disobey Evans’ (1982) Generality Constraint. This 
famous principle dictates that grasping sophisticated thoughts requires the exercise of 
two simultaneous skills. To have a thought respecting the Generality Constraint, say, 
Bassel is wise, I must be able to attribute wisdom to a variety of objects, and I must be 
able to comprehend a spectrum of thoughts about Bassel independently of thoughts 
about wisdom (Cussins, 1992; Evans, 1982). Adherence of thought to the Generality 
Constraint is generally considered to be indicative of the presence of conceptual 
content (Evans, 1982; Gillett, 1987; Smith, 1999). Recall that I take concepts to be 
nothing more than mental representations or thought elements that may be 
recombined and flexibly rearranged. Concepts, I am assuming, need not depend on 
linguistic capacities. Therefore, in adopting singular terms and predicates as the 
building blocks for general and conceptual thought, I will hold that they may be 
object and property representations constituted by visual or motor imagery just as 
they may be linguistic names and properties. 
Separation is grounded in a skilled kind of access to the perceptual world. 
What links such an ability to having general or conceptual thoughts? This question 
cuts to the heart of what full-fledged separation is. Becoming separate is an 
acquisition of thought elements, gathered and tended in the perceptual world, which 
can be flexibly deployed in contemplation, often off-line from perception. Jesse 
Prinz’s neo-empiricist view that “all (human) concepts are copies or combinations of 
copies of perceptual representations” (2002, p. 108; cf. 2007) is almost right. For 
singular terms to be independent of property predicating terms, however, the objects 
they refer to must be comprehended not as unstable popjects and popject features, but 
as persisting individuals independent of a perceived scene. Popjects are nonetheless 
essential to this enterprise. It is popjects which must be stabilised and sedimented into 
objects.  
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True objects have dimensions far surpassing their spatiotemporal appearances. 
In referring to Chris, I refer to Chris who is a collection of molecules, Chris who was 
at home yesterday, and Chris who will be excited about the concert all with the same 
act of reference (Smith, 1996). Indeed, to extrapolate Frege’s (1980) Context 
Principle, understanding objects just is to understand them in situations, doing things, 
being certain ways. The recombination of conceptual elements entails that singular 
terms or predicates can be unplugged from a mutual coupling and grasped to have or 
lack a range of properties, or to belong to numerous objects, respectively. This 
correspondence suggests the link between separation and conceptuality. Objects and 
object arrangements are the recombinable furniture of the world, and the singular 
terms and predicates representing them form the recombinable furniture of 
conceptuality.  
Not only objects but also their arrangements must be stabilised in conceptual 
thought. Understanding predicates, say grasping the notion of quickness, requires a 
stabilisation and sedimentation of the different states and various articulations that 
objects can embody. This crucially involves grasping that objects can be at different 
spatiotemporal positions in the world, and that they are both efficacious and 
vulnerable: they both causally affect and are affected by the world. Notice that the 
capacities to conceptualise objects and their arrangements are independent but vitally 
intertwined. Grasping what kind of states predicates refer to depends on 
understanding something about objects (and not just seeing popjects), and grasping 
what objects are requires imagining them in different places and different times, 
causally interacting with different things. Indeed, these are the two cognitive skills 
Evans alludes to in describing the Generality Constraint, except that these skills are 
more than ‘cognitive’. They are skills deriving from immersion in a material world. 
To have true objects in mind, a creature must share an enriching co-existence with 
them.  
Material objects begin life as proto-separated thinkers’ unstable popjects. The 
case is different for abstract terms and predicates unlikely to be brought before the 
visual system. Consider the thought Truth conquers all. The concepts involved do not 
begin as popjects. Perhaps the concept truth results from stabilising the directive 
superiority of a thought about objects and states that obtains in the world over 
graspable but non-presentational thoughts. The concept all may be a stabilisation of 
the total domain of objects available in completing an unsaturated thought, like x is 
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red. To stabilise abstract relationships, general thoughts about true objects must 
already be in place, and likely linguistic competence too (Cussins, 1992). These 
conceptual capacities cannot be explained by the more primitive task of extruding 
objects, then. They are post-separation capacities. Stabilising objects and 
arrangements is sufficient for conceptual thinking, but not for conceptual mastery. 
Thoughts about immaterial or abstract objects may demand full-fledged separation 
skills in concert with other factors.  
Incidentally, this poses no problem. Even as a fully separated creature, I may 
have trouble conceptualising things or pairing concepts together. Associating a 
concept sedimented from perception, like chair, with an abstract one like being made 
of quarks, to form The chair is made of quarks, may be beyond me if I misunderstand 
what quarks are. My thoughts are still general, though, since chair-thoughts and 
made-of-quark-thoughts do not directly preclude each other in my thinking. I grasp 
what it would be for a chair to have various properties, and once I do learn the 
concept made of quarks, I learn it insofar as I can apply it to a multitude of singular 
terms. This echoes the case of all abstract concepts, which may come later to a 
conceptual creature than perceptually salient concepts.  
With respect to the two construals of separation, it has been established that 
being separate qua thinking about objects makes for a conceptual thinker. General 
thought about objects is furthermore essential for reflection on what is spatially or 
temporally removed from the thinker. It is none other than objects and their 
arrangements that are thought about off-line from perceptual input. Object and 
property representations comprise all thoughts about what is distally or temporally 
remote. Rehearsing nonconceptual perceptual memories would be a specious example 
of separated, conceptual thought. Just as quickness could not be thought about 
whenever foxes were thought about, non-perceptual elements would be precluded 
whenever perceptual elements were rehearsed, in violation of generality. 
Additionally, thinking about perceived elements as true objects involves more than 
ventral vision. When I reason that this water bottle would make a good bludgeon for a 
nearby pest, I am exercising conceptual separation abilities in the here-and-now, 
thereby detaching from what is presented to me in vision. Finally, it is objects and 
their arrangements which will matter enough to a creature that it will direct thoughts 
at them when they disappear; popjects are too ephemeral to shoulder such influence.  
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A separated creature thinks about more than it perceives. It thinks about 
objects and the ways objects can be, and in doing so it must necessarily be thinking of 
them as general and variable, as more than what they appear to be. And though it 
thinks about more than it perceives, the creature begins by modestly perceiving 
simple popjects. How, then, does such a rudimentary kind of thinking as seeing 
unstable popjects, perhaps even remembering them, blossom into generalised thought 
about multilayered objects and, what is equivalent, into conceptual, general thought? 
Here is a survey of some theoretical proposals. 
Social and cultural immersion probably have something to do with it. Dennett 
(1996) reasons that the advent of communication heralds the achievement of 
conceptuality with its upshot of linguistic thought about ‘thicker’ objects and 
properties. Cussins (1992), too, gestures towards language: “One familiar and 
important way in which stabilization is achieved is by drawing a linguistic blackbox 
around a feature-space: the imposition of linguistic structure on experiential structure” 
(p. 679). However, it is unclear to me that syntax or grammar emerge prior to 
separated thinking rather than because of it, or concurrently with it. Perhaps, then, 
something like a diffuse social atmosphere where individuals are not always in direct 
contact with one another is a better prior condition. For Dennett, such an atmosphere 
makes it possible and advantageous to fabricate reasons for one’s behaviour and self-
attribute them, thereby triggering the development of language.  
Self-attributions of this kind appear to be on the right track, since they just are 
thickenings of the idea of objects of a very special sort – persons (Strawson, 1959). 
Smith’s four early signs of separation support the importance of membership in a 
society of conspecifics. Social immersion may, for instance, allow for a profound kind 
of responsibility and commitment to one’s role in the world. Commitment to the 
world would drive a normatively guided thickening of popjects into objects even as 
attributing new significance to objects fostered new commitments. My role in society 
prohibits my treating others as mere visual apparitions. I cannot throw darts at a 
fellow creature the way I might deface a photograph without incurring serious 
consequences. 
Commitment and responsibility can be exported from a social context and 
distilled into a kind of discriminating world-directedness. Avila-García and Cañamero 
(2005) describe how simulated hormonal modulation can influence a robot’s choice of 
actions in its environment by directly colouring its sensory input. We may compare 
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this to the child’s game where a player’s goal-directed navigation is controlled by an 
accomplice’s shouts of ‘hotter!’ and ‘colder!’. Goal-directed behaviour presupposes 
this sort of differential relationship with the world. It figures into both the selection of 
goal states and of means to those ends. Commitment and responsibility, too, are at 
once consequences of taking, and reasons to take, certain bits of the world to matter 
more than others. Via this discriminating, world-involving gaze, popjects may gain 
some of the depth of true objects (Smith, 1996). It is, after all, part of the ontological 
status of my teddy bear Teddy that he is one of my oldest possessions, that I am fond 
of his mangy appearance, that I care about him.  
Mining the physical realm for insight into the achievement of separated 
thought is just as revealing. According to John Campbell (1995), “[t]o be using a term 
to refer to a concrete object, one’s reasoning using the term must display a grasp of 
the two dimensions of the causal structure of the thing: being internally causally 
connected over time and being a common cause of many phenomena” (p. 32). Ideas 
about objects being causally connected over breaks in observation will be inextricable 
from a grasp of object permanence and the existence of an independent, persistent 
world. Whatever new mental prowess allows a creature to reidentify objects as well as 
recognise popjects will play a role in the genesis of separation. 
Vee is at a loss when it comes to securing the above ingredients for separation. 
A ventral visual system could not possibly underlie all this richness. Yet, a partial 
solution might not be far removed from ventral vision. Some ingredients that go into 
full-fledged separation will ultimately be secured by visual processing. We need only 
turn to the dorsal system.  
 
3.3: Dorsal Processing and Engagement 
 
Our assortment of thickening agents, from understanding causal physical 
structure, to being able to reidentify objects and knowing that reality is mind-
independent, to being differentially world-directed, cannot be explained without 
invoking the functions of dorsal processing. The significance of societal context, and 
perhaps even the dawn of linguistic communication, will also implicate vision-for-
action in the developmental tale of a separated creature. For the connection between 
dorsal visual processing and separation to neatly rise to the surface, an elaboration of 
the properties and constituents of dorsal processing is in order.  
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Assume that there could be a creature whose midbrain visual system has just 
evolved a dorsal stream, but not yet a ventral stream. This dorsal counterpart of Vee is 
named Dai. What is it for Dai to perceive the world? In a 2002 paper, Joel Norman 
explicitly drew strong parallels between the features of dorsal-style vision and the 
Gibsonian notion of ecological perception. Such a connection is implicit in several 
psychological, philosophical, and computational analyses (cf. Butterworth, 1995; 
Chemero, 2007; Hatfield, 1990; Jordan, 2003). For Gibsonian theorists, Norman 
contends, “[p]erception is an achievement, a keeping-in-touch, not a passive 
experiencing of one’s conscious responses to stimulation. This view contrasts with the 
constructivist perspective of a perceiver who passively examines her/his conscious 
awareness of the stimulation impinging on her/his senses. This view of perception as 
resulting from an active perceiver is, of course, consonant with what we know about 
dorsal system functions” (2002, ms. p. 19). It is not only the link between perception 
and action that ties the ecological approach to dorsal vision, however. Here are a few 
more commonalities.  
Dorsal perception may be thought of as the perception of Gibsonian 
affordances for action specified in the optic array (Norman, 2002). Says Gibson: “The 
affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or for ill” (1979, p. 127). For instance, something might be 
sit-on-able or climb-on-able or graspable. Affordances are contained within the 
sensory tableau. “The basic properties of the environment that make an affordance are 
specified in the structure of ambient light, and hence the affordance itself is specified 
in ambient light” (Gibson, 1979, p. 143). It makes sense, then, that the egocentric 
invariant measures processed by the dorsal visual stream are those same affordances 
which specify the parameters of graspability, or, say, climb-on-ability, for the use of 
Dai’s motor systems.  
Direct, ecological perception is deictic and nonconceptual.5 With self- and 
world-specifying information doubly inhering within the format of the creature-
centred optic flow (Bermúdez, 1995), ecological perception is intrinsically deictic and 
even egocentric, insofar as the ego may be unreflective and implicit. Ecological 
perception involves no concepts, being “fundamentally a process of extracting and 
abstracting invariants from the flowing optical array” (Bermúdez, 1995, p. 162). 
                                                
5 That is, conceptuality is beyond the scope of both proto-separation and engagement. It is 
only available to a separated thinker. 
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These invariants are not recombinable representations of objects and properties, but 
context-specific measures to be fed into action-producing cortical areas (Norman, 
2002). They are abstract only in the sense that they must be transformed from eye-
invariant information to limb-invariant measures, possibly via the mediation of a 
canonical ‘master’ egocentric invariant (Cohen & Andersen, 2002). These points 
overlap with features of dorsal processing. Additionally, just like Dai’s bare dorsal 
processing, ecological perception is amnesic; what is directly perceived is bound to 
the present, taking full advantage of the optic flow by ‘resonating to it’ without the 
interference of explicit memories or predictions (Norman, 2002). 
It is unavoidable that the dorsal stream make use of feature-placing and 
effective visual tracking. Though Dai’s brain cannot use features to create popjects, 
Dai directly perceives body-centred patterns of visual features. Sifting through such 
low-level properties of a vista as features and positions is, Smith claims, “necessary in 
order to control the fine-grained detail of action and perception. If you want to place 
your finger just there, if you want to track that pattern of animal motion against a 
background of grasses waving in the wind, [..] then the rich detail provides critical 
resolution for fine-grained action” (1999, ms. pp. 10-11). Feature-placing is perfectly 
fitting for ecological perception. Located features are resolved into affordances by 
dorsal vision. This does not involve binding features into spatiotemporal popjects. 
Rather, feature patterns that make up affordances may be spatially diffuse, cross-
cutting objects in the scene.  
Ecological perception is a powerful framework for understanding Dai’s 
perception of the world. However, properties have been attributed to dorsal 
processing which remain unelaborated within the ecological approach. Jacob and 
Jeannerod (2005) claim that dorsal perception is neither helpfully conceived of as 
conceptual nor nonconceptual but as visuomotor: geared for visually guided action, 
egocentric, absolute in frame, and operating efficiently on a very limited range of 
features extracted from the scene (Bermúdez, 2007). This echoes Nudds’ (2007) 
recommendation that dorsal content be considered directive. Several recent accounts 
of the dorsal stream have attributed a great deal of cognitive complexity to its 
functions. Jeannerod (2006) argues that dorsal processing is part of a system for 
motor cognition, and is involved in the production of action representations, motor 
imagery, imitation, and tool use. In fact, Jeannerod wishes to revamp dominant 
depictions of the dorsal stream, replacing them with the idea of a system which distils 
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conceptual sensory and proprioceptive representations into nonconceptual action 
specifying and controlling measures. Gallese (2007), too, implicates dorsal structures 
in spatial awareness and action representation.  
Is Dai’s visual processing as sophisticated as Jeannerod and Gallese would 
like, or have separation-based skills leaked into the discussion of what is supposed to 
be active perception in a present and body-centred environment? It is hard to say 
where the boundaries of engagement lie. For we might think it overkill to marshal 
dorsal processing to explain simplistic causal interplay with an environment, where 
survival is irrelevant. A midbrain visual system ought to be more than sufficient for 
that (Eilan, 1995). Even a weathervane or a Watt governor would be proficient at that 
kind of engagement! Yet Jeannerod’s roster of dorsal skills, including conceptual 
action representations, seems too substantial to count even as survival-oriented 
engagement. Here the pressure to re-admit dorsal processing into the story of full-
fledged separation is supplemented by an equal pressure to restore ventral processing 
to its role in evolving and enriching bare engagement into rich engagement as we 
humans know it. We need to upgrade from weathervanes to ballerinas. After all, 
dorsal and ventral vision historically evolved in tandem (Goodale & Milner, 2004). 
We must therefore take leave of our metaphysically unlikely specimens, Vee and Dai, 
and reunite the functions of dorsal and ventral processing, and the skills of separation 
and engagement.  
 
4: Interlaced Contributions 
   
 What is the role of dorsal processing in achieving full-fledged separation? 
Recall the factors thought to contribute to turning popjects into conceptual 
representations of objects in a permanent world: 
 
1. A grasp of concrete objects as intrinsically causally coherent over 
time and as common causes for events. A grasp of object 
permanence and world permanence. The ability to reidentify as well 
as recognise objects. 
2. Differential world-directedness, including goal-directed action, 
responsibility, and commitment. 
3. Social immersion: language, or an environment of conspecifics.  
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Before we treat these specific recommendations, a more general point. If 
Gallese and Lakoff (2005) are right, many of our concepts, even abstract ones, are 
embodied. They result from activating sensorimotor parameters for action in dorsal 
cortical areas. This resembles Jeannerod’s (2006) contention that all representations 
of actions activate visuomotor areas of the brain. We certainly cannot have a full 
conceptual suite without conceptualising the states objects can be in and, if they are 
sophisticated enough, the actions they can perform. If these researchers are right, and 
there is empirical evidence that at least concepts for action and intention are embodied 
(Jeannerod, 2006), then detached proto-separated representations cannot secure all 
concepts. We need skills of engagement to conceptualise objects moving, doing, 
being affected, being arranged. This is a first endorsement of the role of dorsal 
processing in separation. 
Whereas popjects are collections of located visual features, concrete objects 
are causal and temporally extended, with causally connected parts. Campbell (1995) 
makes this a condition on our acts of reference: “We do not think of a concrete object 
as simply a collection of features. This shows up in the fact that for one to be using a 
singular term to refer to an object, there must be a certain density and structure in the 
conceptual role one assigns to the term” (p. 31). Infants come to think of themselves – 
their bodies and mental states – as coherent and stable common causes, Campbell 
continues, by imitating others while experiencing an awareness of the acts of their 
own bodies. One might wonder whether Strawson (1959) was right to claim that 
reidentifying persons qua mental and physical is conditional on first reidentifying 
material bodies. Meltzoff and Moore (1995) maintain that babies’ knowledge about 
human bodies and actions, and budding knowledge of objecthood, enrich each other. 
Imitation, being present from birth, fosters an understanding of self and other as 
concrete objects. As Meltzoff and Moore’s discussion implies, Strawson’s order of 
events may be too restrictive. Perhaps reidentifying person-bodies at the outset, via a 
visuomotor imitation-based perception of them, yields hypotheses about the 
permanence of the world and all its concrete objects.  
Due to two-way imitation, infants discover that human bodies are a) internally 
stable over time – the same tongue protrusion emanating from the recognised popject 
on two occasions is good evidence that both popject and baby have remained 
internally stable insofar as the baby has the same phenomenology when she and the 
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popject produce the expression, and b) common causes of events – when the baby 
moves her tongue and opens her mouth, she can sense that those actions belong to the 
same imitative exchange with another human body and require the same effort. In 
fact, Campbell (1995) says that knowledge of causal structure is tied up with, and 
may induce, some sense of object and world permanence. Causal coherence requires 
that experiences of my body vary in systematic, non-radical ways across time and 
across changes in my spatial locations, which may lead me to conclude that I continue 
to exist when I fall asleep, for instance. And if I am intrinsically similar to the visual 
popjects I imitate, I may extrapolate that interpretation to the world at large. Dorsal 
vision for imitation, in these ways, may help turn visual popjects into causal, 
permanent objects.  
What about caring about the world, or having a compelling differential 
perception of it? I believe that dorsal stream processing contains within its brand of 
perceptual processing the very spark that makes a creature respond differentially to its 
surroundings. Vision-for-action just is vision that constitutes a driving force for the 
perceiving creature. It is the accomplice screaming ‘hotter! now, colder!’. Dorsal 
vision is directive, computing a landscape of competing affordances, some pointing 
the creature towards benefit, some directing it away from disadvantage, and all 
enabling goal-directed behaviour. And because the dorsal system is visuomotor, with 
heavy interconnections with motor cortex (Jeannerod, 2006), this world of 
affordances suffices to compel a creature to avoid a predator or climb a berry tree – in 
short, to care about itself and its world. This secures a ground for commitment to and 
responsibility for one’s own survival. As for commitment and responsibility towards 
others, what, if not the ability to have inner sensations correlated to what is seen, in 
the first instance because of imitative capacities and mirror neuron function, could 
subserve such significance? Several philosophers, famously Perry (1979), have also 
noted that indexicality and perspectivalness are motivating forces for action. It is not 
until I consider that the sinking ship Atlantis is this keeling ship beneath my feet that I 
am compelled to find a lifeboat (Pylyshyn, 2000). Egocentric processing of visual 
scenes is dorsally mediated, a feature of engagement, not separation. 
Turning to social factors, there is evidence that any major implication of social 
immersion must begin with visually guided action in the form of imitation (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1995). Imitation appears to be an innate mechanism for figuratively 
questioning the world, beginning with caretakers. Meltzoff and Moore argue that 
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imitating expressions is a discrimination tool for infants. By feeling their own faces 
automatically contort in the way daddy’s smile does as opposed to mommy’s pout, 
babies take the first step to populating their worlds with conspecifics and 
reidentifying persons as permanent objects, sometimes held to initiate the 
achievement of a permanent reality (Strawson, 1959). Imitation involves medial brain 
regions but also dorsal areas (Jeannerod, 2006). Word semantics, too, has been 
claimed to have dorsal roots. “[P]erception of a word,” says Jeannerod, “would 
automatically activate the mechanism for recognizing and identifying the 
corresponding reality: action words would activate the motor system to the same 
extent as visual words would activate the visual system” (2006, p. 163). This might 
mean that linguistic reference simply cannot emerge without visuomotor processing.  
What this discussion demonstrates is that, one way or another, separation 
relies on dorsal processing and the engagement skills it enables. Does ventral stream 
processing have a similar role in engagement? I mentioned before that dorsal 
processing seems too powerful to be pressed into the service of mere action and 
reaction in an environment. Pure engagement need not be anything other than deictic 
causal interplay with an environment; at most it is causal interplay with the goal of 
survival. A midbrain visual system could provide that functionality. This sort of 
purely engaged creature would not end up with capacities for action representation, 
imitation, embodied concepts, motor imagery, and the like. Purely dorsal creatures 
would not end up with these rich capabilities. It is a sign of the cooperation of ventral 
and dorsal processing that dorsal vision is as rich as it is. The engagement we 
experience, which Dai could not experience, is rich, ventrally augmented engagement.  
Popjectification is conceptually prior to rich engagement. Let us suppose pure 
engagement could call upon survival-oriented visual tracking and feature-placing, but 
not popject-making. This seems reasonable, as we have found that both Vee and Dai 
should have these primitive abilities due to midbrain processing or computation in 
V1, probably with contributions from low-level attention or memory systems. Armed 
with only these capacities, it would be impossible for a purely engaged creature to 
have action representations or experience motor imagery. Representations of actions, 
as opposed to trackable movement, must presuppose at least rudimentary ideas of 
intentions; and motor images, like embodied concepts, cannot be free-floating 
arrangements of movement impulses (cf. Brewer, 1995). Motor activity and action are 
what things achieve. While things need not in this case be resolved into thick objects, 
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at least a popject canvas is presupposed by Jeannerod’s conception of action-
mediating systems as cognitive. If Smith (1996) is right, causality operates at the level 
of bare-bones deictic flux, and not objects. But action is not mere causality. One 
surely cannot understand motor control or goal-directed movement without first 
having a skeleton of coherent amalgams of features on which to culture richer 
properties like intentions. Just as location serves in enabling feature-placing, the 
ventral stream will perform the role of binding dorsally involved cognitive 
representations of agency, motor function, intentionality, and so on, to things that 
happen to possess them.  
Fledgling engagement is soon enough enriched by fledgling proto-separation. 
Other tools for thinking, especially language and knowledge-sharing in a wide 
cultural context, may also contribute. The end result is a creature able to engage its 
world quickly, efficiently, but with internalised benefits from seeing the world as 
carved into objects. The same creature displays true separation, including 
conceptualisations of action, of causally thick objects, and a compelling motivation to 
selectively represent and alter its world, while taking responsibility for those choices. 
This creature cares enough to think about what is not locally and presently available 
in a sensory array. And while raw engagement might be uninteresting, both rich 
engagement and full-fledged separation are vital, interlaced achievements. Such 
talents, unsurprisingly, make contact with issues about self-consciousness. I will turn 
to these questions now. 
 
5: Separation, Engagement, and the Achievement of Self-
Consciousness 
 
As a point of contrast, I will begin with a sketch of the kind of self-
consciousness that might arise from dorsal contributions associated with survival-
oriented engagement. This is not a frustrating resuscitation of Dai as much as a 
question worth asking about non-mammalian creatures. Ecological perception has 
been thought to afford creatures a humble type of self-consciousness (Gibson, 1979; 
Zahavi, 2002). Perceivers like these position patterns of visual features in the world 
and react sensitively to them. All this action and perception emanates from an 
inherently perspectival perch. By seeing affordances, these creatures demonstrate a 
causally indexical comprehension of their surroundings, appreciating the relevance of 
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what they perceive for their own actions (Campbell, 1993; Bermúdez, 1995). 
Perspective smuggles a vestige of self-consciousness into experience. For some 
theorists this self is mundane: the visual occlusion produced by the shape of my nose 
allows me to perceive my bodily self within my every perception of the world 
(Gibson, 1979). It roughly maps onto what Legrand (2007) calls the transparent self, 
what Eilan (1995) conceives of as a raw point of view, and what, for Bermúdez 
(1995) is a primitive subject and an egocentric origin.  
This self is conscious of the world from a unique perspective, but cannot turn 
its periscope onto its own person – onto itself as mind or body. This is because the 
creature cannot yet think about objects, and lacking conceptuality, it cannot think of 
itself as an autonomous, discrete individual among others.6 “If there are no 
experiences with contents of objects and places,” notes Cussins, “then there are no 
resources for distinguishing between the contribution of the world and the 
contribution of the subject” (1992, p. 669). Lacking detachment skills, the creature 
fails to pull itself free of a self-world coupling. Strawson (1959) would call this 
creature solipsistic; it gets by without separating out its own contributions to 
perception from those of the world. While this consciousness of the world subsumes a 
perception of the self, and is bounded by the perspectival nature of spatiotemporal 
position and the dimensions of the body, it is not a consciousness which may reflect 
upon the contributions to experience which stem from that perspectival self. 
Nevertheless, this selfhood is by no means insignificant. We have already seen that 
indexicality helps secure separation. Moreover, without the self-world perception of 
the primitive engaged subject, there would be no bedrock subjective mentality to 
sediment a popject into a richly self-conscious individual (Bermúdez, 1995). 
The engaged self is primitive, but engagement skills, having been appropriated 
into full-fledged separation, additionally enable the substantive self-consciousness of 
a separated creature to arise. Substantive self-consciousness is an awareness of the 
self as “a persisting object, which is picked out when we refer to ourselves using ‘I’. 
Self-consciousness is a matter of representing oneself as an object” (Eilan, Marcel, & 
Bermúdez, 1995). As we want to allow for pre-linguistic separation and 
conceptuality, the language-use characterisation is superfluous. This is a minor 
alteration. What is important is that the creature be able to think of itself in a general 
                                                
6 Though the creature might be able to recognise its limbs, it will not be able to reidentify 
them. 
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way, directing thoughts onto itself as an object. In utilising the concept of itself as a 
person, physical and mental at once, this creature is finally non-solipsistic, 
distinguishing itself from the world in thought (Strawson, 1959). 
How would separation skills result in framing oneself as an object among 
others? Our evolutionary predecessors probably took the ventral visual route, 
beginning by popjectifying their own visible bodies. Actions, intentions, and causal 
indexicality would have been bound to this popject via a mix of visuomotor and 
ventral perception. The phenomenology of the perspectival, transparent subject – the 
self implicit in ecological perception – would then start to become associated with the 
condensing object. Burgeoning substantive self-consciousness would have been 
helped further along by imitation capacities, cementing a sense of self as temporally 
and spatially extended. Imitation could also help fill visual gaps: by popjectifying 
another human body from an allocentric perspective as I imitate its expressions, I 
come to know that I am more than a four-limbed torso and a nose-shaped wedge. 
Realistically, there is more accruable information about the self than vision can 
afford. Kinaesthesis, proprioception, and feelings of effort would also have 
participated in this drive towards objecthood and personhood.  
Of course, once separation becomes its standard mode of thinking, a creature 
need not take the long and winding route up from popjectivity to self-objectivity; it 
need not see its limbs to come to know itself as an object. It may begin with its causal 
structure as an agent, or with its similarities to an imitated person, or with a sense of 
commitment and self-preservation, and infer objecthood from those.7 Or it may begin 
even higher up, with a more abstracted logical notion of self, as the originator of 
thoughts which are not perceived to have sources in the external world, for instance 
(Prinz, 2003). Being conceptual, the creature’s grasping any of these stabilisations of 
self would amount to its knowing itself as object; autonomous, discrete, and capable 
of possessing many properties and being in many states.  
Substantive self-consciousness may fail to capture denser notions of selfhood, 
however. Augmentation by various cultural tools for enhanced thought, resulting in 
expanded self-conceptions and (meta)physically expanded selves (Clark & Chalmers, 
                                                
7 Why should a separated creature have inferential skills? Inference is implicit in the skills 
honed in on by the Generality Constraint. We may exemplify the generality skill exercised in 
grasping a is F as follows: a is F  [∀ x ⊂ D (x is F), where D is some appropriate and 
general domain of objects]. Whenever the conceptual creature grasps the antecedent, it infers 
the general consequent. 
Saab  34 
1998), does not directly follow from being a substantive, separated self. With the 
possible exception of language, these self-creating extensions call on capacities that 
are not presupposed by separation. Dennett claims that “[w]ords and other mind tools 
give a Gregorian creature an inner environment that permits it to construct ever more 
subtle move generators and move testers” (1996, p. 132), where a Gregorian creature 
is one that can refine its thoughts based on designs and structures in the external 
world (Clark, 2002). The separated creature is not by rights a Gregorian creature. All 
it can do is stabilise the world by bringing its thoughts and actions to bear on it. The 
Gregorian creature does something more advanced; it stabilises and streamlines its 
mind by bringing culture and the environment to bear on it. We can imagine a 
separated creature who is not yet Gregorian, but a Gregorian creature must first be 
separated, because it must conceptualise the world as a world, of tools as tools, and of 
communication as an exchange of ideas between individuals. Likewise, without 
leaning heavily on enculturation, separation cannot explain the so-called narrative 
view of self nor Wolfgang Prinz’s self-morphic state, both of which liken the self to 
the protagonist of a temporally extended autobiographical tale (Prinz, 2003; Proust, 
2003). Self-narratives derive from oral traditions in mind-external cultural contexts.  
The substantive self-consciousness of the newly separated creature is the most 
basic form of reflective self-awareness. Indeed, we find that even barer, 
nonconceptual, engaged notions of self, if they are to be reflected upon as well as 
present experientially, have to be preceded by separated self-consciousness. 
Reflections on the self as an ecological self, as a raw point of view, or as a 
performative self or agent (Legrand, 2007; Stern, 1985) are post-separation varieties 
of self-consciousness. We must grasp personal objecthood before we can grasp, say, 
egocentricity, which is a property of persons. This harkens back to the argument that 
popjectification is conceptually prior to enriched engagement.  
Reflective self-awareness does not preclude pre-reflective selfhood. The 
separated creature will continue to embody the simpler sorts of self-consciousness 
that it will have mastered en route to becoming fully separated. The creature will 
experience affect, effort, and bodily sensations. It will experience its body as 
physically coherent and bounded, though not always by reflecting on it as its body. It 
will be able to track its own spatiotemporal route through the world (Butterworth, 
1995). Being inherently material, the creature will never totally disengage from the 
world, and will always be an unreflective ecological subject as well as a substantive 
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self. Even if it could be purely detached, by doing so it would cease to have the right 
sorts of interactions for understanding itself and others. Substantive self-
consciousness is an added ability, not an usurpation of engaged self-perception 
(Smith, 1996; Legrand, 2007). We are at once conceptual selves and ecological 
selves, subjects and objects. A substantive self-conscious creature conceives of itself 
as a certain sort of object, a person, and a person is no more a disembodied 
consciousness than it is a lifeless hunk of matter; it is constitutively both at once. A 
sense of personhood is only achieved through the cooperation of these two aspects, 
the creature’s physical reality and its mentality (Strawson, 1959). That is what makes 
conceptual awareness of one’s personhood a landmark achievement for a thinking 
creature. 
 
6: Objections and Questions Arising 
 
Before concluding, I will tackle potential objections to the claims made 
throughout this paper. I have been arguing that the functions of visual perception 
enable new kinds of mental capacities, those of separation and engagement. These 
skills turn out to be deeply entwined, and each supports a different facet of self-
consciousness.  
A key question relates to the centrality of vision to this account. Granting that 
perception plays a crucial part in separation and engagement, there is still the further 
contention that of all the sensory modalities, it is vision which underlies these skills. 
Is the insistence on a visual foundation justified? There are certainly points that 
recommend vision over the other senses, at least in primate cognition. Visual streams 
carry out two vital parsings of the world. This functional dedication is more obvious 
in vision than other modalities. Moreover, visual processing areas comprise about 
sixty percent of the primate neocortex, and the human retina can register the smallest 
physical quantity of light that exists (Goodale, 1995). In rubber hand experiments, 
subjects are tricked into perceiving fallacious hand motions, despite contradictory 
proprioceptive information, by watching strategically placed dummy hands move in 
the wrong direction. Experiments like these demonstrate that vision can override 
much of our sensory perception, even ‘private’ sensations. As Jeannerod puts it, 
“vision has a prevalent role over other senses in [self-identification]: we feel our hand 
where we see it, not the converse” (2006, p. 73).  
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This first response is unsatisfying, though. It only shows that if visual function 
underlies separation and engagement, we have a contingently lucky pairing. At least 
two sizeable worries remain. Could other sensory modalities, alone or in cooperation, 
underlie separation and engagement? That is, is there anything more than a contingent 
relationship between vision and the abovementioned capacities? And, second, even 
given that vision enabled greater cognitive abilities in primate evolution, could it not 
be that the burgeoning evolutionary advantage afforded by separation and 
engagement drove the functional division within duplex vision? In other words, is the 
story backwards? 
It is not unimaginable, of course, that there could be a non-visual duplex 
sensory modality interpreting the same world in two interlaced ways, perceiving 
parameters for action while stabilising the world for conceptual contemplation. But 
whether the scenario is metaphysically feasible is trickier. It is not the neurofunctional 
potential of other sensory modalities that is the problem, but rather how they relate to 
the properties of the material world. The material world is spatiotemporal, profoundly 
spatiotemporal. “[R]eal space,” Grush remarks, “is where one’s sensory states and 
behavioral actions are appropriately integrated” (2007, ms. p. 16). Engaged activity 
takes place in egocentrically constrained spaces, in real time, and separated thought is 
potent precisely because it defies local space, and because it time travels. Concepts 
refer instantaneously to objects in the farthest reaches of the galaxy, and these 
referents are seldom momentary time-slices (Smith, 1996). Objects are temporally 
and spatially extended, and conceptual thought captures some of this breadth. 
Separation is defined by its defiance of spatiotemporal dimensions, but only because 
space and time dictate its boundaries.  
Where other senses may resolve temporal change, vision is the primary 
modality for resolving the world into spatiotemporal information. Touch, too, resolves 
sensation spatially, but only insofar as the sensations are smotheringly engaged. The 
body, being the spatiotemporal canvas for the sense of touch, brings perception of the 
world to a bottleneck at the skin-world barrier. Tactile perception could only 
satisfactorily depict the spatial world insofar as it brought a visual panorama to the 
skin’s surface, as occurs in tactile-visual substitution systems (Grush, 2007). The 
difference is not one of the quantity of space accessible to a sensory modality; it is 
one of respecting all the different relational arrangements of objects that can occur in 
three dimensions. Touch is very limited in this regard; if a small cube presses against 
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my skin, the large globe behind it will be excluded from tactile perception, though not 
occluded visually. As Strawson’s (1959) poignant Sound World thought experiment 
made clear, an auditory world, being non-spatial, cannot be as elaborate as the visual 
world in parsing raw information into stable particulars. The thought experiment 
stumbles on the need to endow the Sound World inhabitant with an auditory body 
rather than representing him as a non-extended perspectival origin, an indexical 
singularity (Strawson, 1959). Taste and smell have the same shortcomings as 
audition. Only in space and time does it makes sense to speak of causality, 
reidentification, engagement, separation, social interaction, and so on. That is why 
vision turns out to be the most suitable sense out of the five that humans have at their 
disposal.8 
The second concern was that the relationship between vision, separation, and 
engagement is backwards. Duplex vision is not really behind separation and 
engagement; natural selection for the skills of separation and engagement drove the 
visual system to arrange itself to maximise functional dedication to these abilities. 
There are two ways of reading this objection. If it implies that evolution favoured 
visual systems which displayed signs of useful burgeoning capacities for separation 
and engagement, then it is not an objection at all. However, the objection becomes 
more interesting if it really means that other pre-existing separation and engagement 
capacities in the creature fostered the functional division in the visual brain.  
On this reading, the objection, in one sense, is exactly right. There were 
certainly engaged activities the pre-visual or pre-duplex-visioned creature could 
partake in. It could move about, for one thing. But separation is, intuitively, a different 
matter. To deem that evolution could create a (proto-)separated creature which could 
not yet see is to make the strong claim that objects could be conceived of without the 
aid of an intrinsically spatial sensory modality. I have argued that there is much more 
to objects than their appearances in visual scenes. But I have also argued that these 
other characteristics must be tied to a coherent candidate which possesses them. I 
advanced popjects for this role. Could there be other candidates? An object concept 
would work, if it were not the case that evolution offers ample examples of 
nonconceptual sighted species and none of conceptual blind ones. Similarly, we might 
                                                
8 It is not the only metaphysically viable choice, though. As alluded to, tactile-visual 
substitution systems ought to enable both separation and engagement. A modality like 
echolocation might also suffice.  
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imagine that a language-user’s separated thinking would make it advantageous to 
have a ventral stream that packaged the world into referents, were it not so strange to 
think that language could drive the evolution of vision. In our evolutionary history, at 
least, it is safe to say that separation skills were acquired downstream of becoming 
sighted. Unless we admit our sightless primeval ancestors among conceptual 
creatures, a less than compelling move (Carruthers, 2004), we must concede that sight 
emerged before separated thought. Whether this had to be the case is a matter of 
speculation about what other vehicles for objecthood could play the role of popjects. 
There is in any case an alternative story about the bifurcation of the streams. 
Researchers claim that the architectural split in mammalian visual neurology was due 
to competing computational demands. Ventral and dorsal processing extract different 
information from scenes. The measures and invariants collected for seeing popjects 
and taking action are often incongruous; this would have led to conflicting demands 
on the brain that made it advantageous for a divided layout to emerge (Goodale & 
Milner, 2004). This proposal, though it draws on the conventional anatomical 
distinction, profits from its conciliatory tone. For in accepting it, we may regard that 
computational differences between processes contingently linked to separation and 
engagement made one midbrain visual system into two cortical ones, but that it was 
the subsequent real-time, real-world functioning of the two streams that allowed 
separation and engagement to emerge. Recourse to computational demands also casts 
it as a matter of mere complexity that separation and engagement have distinct neural 
backdrops. Since the streams’ intertwined processing and the cooperation of 
separation with engagement are so critical for our embedded, embodied, and mental 
experiences, we should not expect the architectural division to be a matter of 
metaphysical significance, as if separation and engagement would have somehow 
tainted one another. It is exactly the reverse: neither skill can exist in anything but a 
stunted form without the other. 
Onto questions about how all this ties in with self-consciousness. One might 
wonder whether, for instance, there could be a substantively self-conscious creature 
who could not see objects and who, therefore, lacked the capacity to detach itself 
from its environment. A caveat, first. It has been assumed throughout this discussion 
that modern-day human beings have cultural environments (and, perhaps, brains) that 
reinforce the development of separation and rich engagement to such an extent that 
visual pathologies ought not radically stunt the achievement of separated self-
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consciousness. That is, we live in a post-separation society. Whereas during our 
evolutionary development duplex vision was the best faculty we had for distancing 
ourselves from our environments even as we acted within them, we now have 
language, and human infants’ imitation capacities are now confronted with 
conspecifics who have already achieved general thought, producing a lot more fuel 
for separation than visible facial expressions. An evolving creature would not have 
had the support of such Gregorian tools for thinking. Contemporary patients like D.F. 
are substantively self-conscious, and optic ataxics are too, and that should come as no 
surprise. 
 Modern humans with visual brain pathologies are like aircrafts whose take-off 
thrusters have failed after they are already in the air. But what about candidates who 
are still on the runway, so to speak? I have already considered the issue of whether 
non-visual creatures could become separated. I concluded that other sensory 
modalities might do the job if they were inherently spatial, which is equivalent to a 
claim that non-visual creatures might achieve substantive self-consciousness. But 
these creatures do not bypass separation, they merely take a different route through it. 
There is still the question of how tight the link is between separation and substantive 
self-consciousness.  
Could substantive self-consciousness arise in creatures unable to think about 
objects, and about what is spatially or temporally removed? Is separation necessary 
for awareness of oneself as an object in the world? I believe the answer is yes, on a 
priori grounds. To think about oneself as an object, one must think of objects. To 
think of objects just is the capacity to think about what is far away and temporally 
disconnected insofar as even thinking about objects in a visually present scene (as 
opposed to popjects in a scene) is thinking of them as possibly being elsewhere, or 
moving to different locations, where they will be potentially reidentified (as opposed 
to recognised) by the observer. A creature which did not contemplate objects would 
never pull itself free of closed, causally effective loops with its environment (Smith, 
1996). Creatures like Brooks’ (1991) mobots, if they do not see thick objects, only 
affordances for action, will never become substantively self-conscious. Similarly, a 
fully separate mind with no engagement abilities would never achieve substantive 
self-consciousness either. A von Neumann computer, given its lack of world-directed 
drive, action understanding, imitation skills, and grasp of causal regularities, would 
fall short of objectifying itself in thought. 
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Finally, one might ask what, if anything, distinguishes human self-
consciousness from that of animals which have duplex visual systems. Are we willing 
to ascribe separation and substantive self-consciousness to cats and dogs? We might 
wish to do so, if we are willing to credit them with some kind of conceptuality. Pets 
may be substantively self-conscious but pre-linguistic. Language may just tip the 
scales of intelligence, and the outward appearance of mindedness, that crucial bit 
further, as Dennett claims (1996). After all, humans are not just substantively self-
conscious. We place ourselves within self-narratives and contemplate our positions in 
wider histories. This talent might look surprisingly more impressive from the outside 
than basic substantive self-consciousness does. 
Let us suppose, however, that cats are not substantively self-conscious, being 
creatures unable to think of themselves as objects and manipulate those thoughts 
without hindrance from the world as it presents itself to them. Why would this be the 
case? As I have just said, separation is necessary for substantive self-consciousness. 
Perhaps such creatures are not properly separated from their perceptual worlds. This 
could be for a number of reasons. Empirical findings could narrow down the 
possibilities. Cats might have visuomotor systems which do not support imitation 
abilities or which otherwise place limits on motor cognition. Similarly, their ventral 
streams, or the interconnections between their ventral and dorsal streams, may be less 
elaborate than ours. It would be revealing if animals were found not to perceive dorsal 
affordances in designed objects because they could not ventrally recognise them as 
tools, resulting in oblivious visually guided action towards certain items. Neither is 
duplex vision a sufficient neural basis for full-fledged separation. Some animals 
might not have the attention or memory capacities to reidentify objects or even sense 
familiarity. Rather, they may display raw stimulus-response behaviour towards 
‘recognised’ items or mechanically habituate to repeated stimuli.  
More likely, however, is that animals’ brains are fine. It is just that animals do 
not form social groupings that are conducive to separated thought. “[O]ur kind of 
thinking,” claims Dennett, “had to wait for talking to emerge, which in turn had to 
wait for secret keeping to emerge, which in turn had to wait for the right 
complexification of the behavioral environment” (1996, p. 172). Secret keeping 
requires animal groupings that are collaborative but which allow each individual to 
wander off, alone, and discover environmental advantages that it might not wish to 
share. Domesticated animals, as intelligent as they seem, tend to lead solitary lives at 
Saab  41 
a distance from conspecifics, whereas wild animals tend to confine themselves to 
crowded, cooperative groupings. 
 
7: Concluding Remarks 
 
 In this essay, I have attempted to show that the functions of the two visual 
streams enable certain embedded cognitive skills which together permit a 
sophisticated kind of self-consciousness to develop. The visual streams in question 
are ventral vision-for-judgement and dorsal vision-for-action. These cognitive skills, I 
have termed separation and engagement. Ventral and dorsal vision are necessary for 
separation and rich engagement and are the main enabling factors – contributions 
from memory and attention systems aside – for proto-separation and modest 
engagement. In turn, proto-separation and engagement are necessary and, when 
intertwined and undertaken in cultural surrounds, sufficient for full-fledged 
separation, which is the world-based skill that maps onto the mind-based capacity for 
general, conceptual thought. (Conceptual mastery of abstract concepts may require 
some further cognitive sophistication than separation.) Separation, with contributions 
from proto-separation and visuomotor understanding, and in the context of continued 
enactive experience, is necessary and sufficient for substantive self-consciousness, the 
capacity to think of oneself as an object. In this way, the account sketched here has 
risen from dichotomies at the neurological level to an integrative, situated recipe for 
selfhood at the psychological level. 
  Questions remain unanswered, and avenues have been left unexplored. Most 
compelling are considerations about the way that subjectivity and objectivity make 
contact with the present concerns. Does being a subject more closely parallel the 
ecological self or the substantive self? Does objectivity come hand in hand with 
separation, or does it require further sophistication? Perhaps it is a prior 
accomplishment of the proto-separated creature. I suspect that the answers to these 
questions will require continued integration between thought and action in the world. 
It would also be helpful to more exhaustively enumerate the factors that enable full-
fledged separation and the transition from seeing popjects to thinking about objects. 
The selection discussed in this paper was intended to highlight the indispensability of 
dorsal contributions to separation, and may have neglected several major conditions 
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on becoming a separated thinker. Specifically, the roles of language and culture 
deserve in-depth analysis.  
 Finally, an interesting question is how seeing popjects and thinking about 
objects relates to what is true. There is something appealing about Smith’s (1996) 
idea that what is taken to exist is both a human construction and normatively 
governed by the world, so that it makes sense to say that some carvings up of the 
world into objects do violence to it, while others respect its constraints. But if that is 
right – and if so, it probably percolates down into the flexibility inherent in 
perceptually selecting popjects – then are the conceptual thoughts which better respect 
the world the true ones, or is this conclusion a misleading temptation? Something pins 
the warrant for our separated thoughts, floating free of time and space, back down to 
the bedrock material world, and whether this is reference, truth, coherence, or simply 
something like living ethically and truly (Smith, 2001), remains to be seen. 
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